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Proof in C17 Algebra
Brendan Larvor
University of Herfordshire
Résumé : Nous nous intéressons dans cet article à la naissance de la no-
tion de preuve algébrique à partir des travaux de Cardano, Viète, Harriot
et Pell. La transition de la preuve géométrique à la preuve algébrique passe
par des références à la théorie eudoxienne des proportions dans le livre V
d’Euclide. L’innovation cruciale dans la notation fut le développement des
parenthèses. Au milieu du dix-septième siècle, la preuve géométrique devient
insoutenable comme garant unique de rigueur parce que les mathématiciens
avaient développé nombre de techniques qui ne pouvaient pas être justifiées en
termes géométriques.
Abstract: This paper considers the birth of algebraic proof by looking at the
works of Cardano, Viète, Harriot and Pell. The transition from geometric to
algebraic proof was mediated by appeals to the Eudoxan theory of proportions
in book V of Euclid. The crucial notational innovation was the development
of brackets. By the middle of the seventeenth century, geometric proof was
unsustainable as the sole standard of rigour because mathematicians had de-
veloped such a number and range of techniques that could not be justified in
geometric terms.
Philosophia Scientiæ, cahier spécial 5, 2005, 43–59.
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By the middle of the sixteenth century there was in Europe, on the
one hand, geometry, which had well-established standards and methods
of proof, and a large body of actual proofs. On the other hand, there
was an emerging body of analytic techniques that did not have their own
criteria or means of proof. These techniques developed naturally out of
simple recipes for performing arithmetical calculations such as the rule
of three or the various methods of long division. Having established
techniques for finding square roots, it was natural for arithmeticians to
extend these techniques to problems that we would nowadays express
in quadratic equations (we still speak of the ‘roots’ of an equation).
In short, geometers looked for theorems with proofs, but people doing
what came to be called ‘algebra’ or ‘specious analysis’ were looking for
solutions. This division is reflected in the titles of algebra books such
as Cardano’s Ars Magna [Cardano 1545] or Harriot’s Artis Analyticae
Praxis [Harriot 1631]. While the word ‘ars ’ (art in the unromantic sense
of craft or technique) was often used, the word ‘scientia’ is pointedly ab-
sent from these book titles. ‘Scientia’ was a highly contested term but
the principal source of its meaning was still Aristotle’s Posterior Analyt-
ics, in which the title of science was reserved for systematic, deductive
knowledge. In the sixteenth century, geometry was widely1 taken to ful-
fil this requirement while algebra did not. However, by the middle of
the seventeenth century we find that algebra is able to offer proofs in its
own right. That is, by that time algebraic argument had achieved the
status of proof. How did this transformation come about?
This question could easily occupy an entire monograph. An appar-
ently continuous historical narrative that registered the many small steps
on the journey, and that paid due attention to the unevenness of the de-
velopment (for fear of presenting an excessively streamlined and whiggish
account) might need more than one book. Historical development is al-
1But not universally. See [Mancosu 1992]. This paper considers the debate fol-
lowing the publication in 1547 of the Commentarium de certitudine mathematicarum
disciplinarum by Alessandro Piccolomini (1508-1578). According to Mancosu, Pic-
colomini attempted to refute “a widespread argument which aimed at showing the
certitude of mathematics (asserted by Aristotle and reiterated by Averroes and a
long list of Aristotelian commentators) arguing from the assumption that mathemat-
ics makes use of the highest type of syllogistic demonstrations” [Mancosu 1992, 244].
The chief point stands, since the mathematics to which this controversy refers is that
of Euclid. As Mancosu put it, the question was, “What is the relationship between
Aristotelian logic and Euclidean mathematics?” [Mancosu 1992, 242]. For Piccolo-
mini and his fellow renaissance writers, the question did not arise with respect to the
analytic art. Things were quite different a century later, when Hobbes, Wallis and
Barrow took up the question of mathematical certainty afresh. Then, the status of
algebra was at the centre of the dispute. See [Sasaki 1985].
Proof in C17 Algebra 45
ways uneven, as there are always individuals ahead of their times and
a greater number behind. The development of early modern algebra is
especially uneven due to the diversity of sources: to an indigenous Euro-
pean tradition of reckoning were added rediscovered Diophantus and the
works of Islamic mathematicians. Moreover, it was at about this time
that national styles and rivalries started to flourish in European science.
In view of these complexities, the most we can hope to achieve in a short
paper is a comparison of snapshots taken at significant moments in the
story. This paper offers a small collection of still photographs rather
than the sort of cinematic sequence that gives an illusion of continuity.
Before we open the photo-album, permit me a methodological note.
The initial sketch of a mathematics divided between problem-solving
‘analysis’ (arithmetic-cum-algebra) and theorem-proving geometry is
broadly-speaking right. Indeed, some Renaissance mathematicians re-
gretted this divide and dreamed of a unified, ‘universal’ mathematics
(‘mathesis universalis’) [Sasaki 1985, 9192; Mancosu 1996, 86]. However,
to set up this division as an absolute distinction is to make a mystery
of the fact that it was eventually overcome. Absolute distinctions create
insoluble historical problems (as Kuhn discovered). Instead, we should
recall that to draw a distinction is at the same time to make a connec-
tion. That is, we must look for points in the historical record where the
apparently absolute distinction breaks down. In other words, we look for
intimations of proof and rigour on the un-rigorous, ‘heuristic’ side of the
division: in the analytic practice; in the modes of argument; but also in
the structure of the books themselves; and the language and notations
used.
1 Girolamo Cardano (1501-1576)
The subject of our first snapshot is Girolamo Cardano’s Arts Magna
[Cardano 1545], in which he systematises and proves the thirteen solu-
tions by radicals of the cubic. There are thirteen solutions because his
proofs are geometric. He interprets the unknown as a line segment and
the coefficients as lines, areas or volumes so as to preserve the homogene-
ity of the sum. (‘Homogeneity’ means that volumes are only added to
volumes, areas to areas and so forth. To achieve this with a cubic equa-
tion, Cardano read the coefficient of the squared term as a line and that
of the linear term read as an area, while he treated the constant term
as a volume. Then, the whole equation is in volumes.) Consequently, he
could only recognise positive coefficients (for what sense can be given to
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negative areas or volumes?), so rather than just the cubic he had thir-
teen variations. He had no symbolism (except the use of letters to label
points on diagrams) and consequently none of the notational machinery
nowadays associated with algebra. Rather, he wrote everything out in
abbreviated prose and gave his proofs in the Euclidean style (see figure
1). This geometrical rigour constrained the scope of his algebra. For him
there could be no rigorous treatment of equations of degree greater than
three because “nature will not allow it”2. That is, there are just three
dimensions in space, and geometry is the means of proof, so nothing can
be proved about equations of degree greater than three.
This geometric standard of rigour was a source of difficulty for Car-
dano because in the appendix to Ars Magna he explains how to solve
a certain class of bi-quadratics (this result was due to his student, Fer-
rari). What is the status of Ferrari’s argument to show that his solutions
of these bi-quadratics are correct? It cannot be proof (by Cardano’s
standards), yet it is entirely persuasive. This, though, is the least of
Cardano’s difficulties. Using modern notation, consider his solution by
radicals of the ‘irreducible’ case of a cubic with three real roots. If a
and N are positive and x3 = ax + N , then:
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the square roots are imaginary and the
whole expression is complex. Nevertheless, the solutions are real. This is
an early instance of a detour through the complex universe prompted by
a question that makes no reference to complex numbers in either its state-
ment or its solution. This problem was more serious than that posed by
equations with complex roots, since in those cases Cardano could simply
declare such roots impossible or nonsensical (as many mathematicians
did). Cubics with three real roots cannot be so dismissed. Thus there
was, for Cardano, a dilemma. On one hand, he had established standards
of proof, on the other he had persuasive results that were impossible in
principle to prove within these standards. As we shall see, this dilemma
intensified in the succeeding century. What was, for Cardano, a small
trickle of results that could not be modelled in the geometry of solids
2“For as positio refers to a line, quadratum to a surface, and cubus to a solid
body, it would be very foolish for us to go beyond this point, nature does not permit
it.” [Cardano 1968, 9]. “Nanque cum positio lineam, quadratum superficiam, cubus
corpus solidum referat, nae utique stultum fuerit, nos ultra progredi, quo naturae no
licet.” [Cardano 1570, 6].
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with finite magnitudes, broadened to a flood. In retrospect, we may (in
a Popperian spirit) regard Cardano’s irreducible cubics and Ferrari’s bi-
quadratics as ‘refutations’ of the metaphysics and methodology implicit
in Cardano’s geometric standards of rigour. However, we should note,
first, that Cardano had no such perspective. Second, his anomalous cases
might have remained as no more than recondite unsolved problems, and
posed little threat to the established methodological order, had they not
been but the first of many.
2 François Viète (1540-1603)
Viète’s principal achievement is the introduction of a recognisably mod-
ern symbolism for variables, coefficients and some operations (though
he still wrote everything else out longhand; note too the use of double
lines to indicate subtraction). Nevertheless, Viète’s algebra seems firmly
within the tradition of problem-solving technique since he gives little or
nothing in the way of proof. Consider, for example, Proposition XVI
of his Ad Logisticen Speciosam Notæ Priores [Viète 1646, 20], which is
in fact a problem-to-solve rather than a hypothesis-to-prove: “To sub-
tract the cube of the difference between two roots from the cube of their
sum.” The argument consists of a single sentence: “Let the individual
solids making up the cube of A − B be subtracted from the individual
solids making up the cube of A + B.” This is, strictly speaking, a pro-
cedure rather than a proof, and he carries it out in the next sentence to
get the answer: in modern notation, 6A2B + 2B3 (see figure 2). How-
ever, we cannot conclude from the brevity of this discussion that Viète
was indifferent to proof. Certainly, he hoped to illustrate the expres-
sive power and heuristic efficiency of his symbolism. However, his texts
have the form (if not the substance) of a deductive, ‘scientific’ system.
He labels his problems as ‘propositions’ and his solutions as ‘theorems’,
and he makes reference to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics [Viète 1983].
In particular he claims that theorems proved by his art conform to the
laws governing the relation of attribute to subject, laid down in Posterior
Analytics, Book I, Part IV. So in terms of the quaestio that Mancosu dis-
cusses, Viète claims for algebra (specifically, for his ‘zetetics’) the status
attributed to Euclidean mathematics by Aristotelian tradition.
The fact that Viète could present a calculation with letters standing
in for arbitrary quantities as a proof, however modest, indicates a change
in the conception of number itself. Viète did not interpret numbers
geometrically as Cardano did, even though he retained the old geometric
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Figure 1: [Cardano 1545, 71]
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vocabulary of ‘squares’ and ‘cubes’ (as indeed we do today). That is
why he felt no obligation to locate a ‘line’ in a diagram (it makes no
sense, to use the example in hand, to ask about the relative positions
of A and B). By contrast, each of Cardano’s proofs implies a diagram:
the elements of the proof are elements of the diagram (line-segments,
areas and volumes with determinate relative positions). The diagram
is essential—it supplies the terms of the theorem with their meanings
(though in fact not every proof in Ars Magna has a diagram printed with
it, since the proofs are all rather similar, so having seen one diagram it
is easy for the reader to supply the others). None of this holds for
Viète, whose few diagrams appear late in the text, after his algebra is
established. Another indication of this change is the fact that Viète
was not bound to three dimensions, even in principle. Cubes of cubes
make sense in Viète’s mathematics. Cardano did work with negative
and complex numbers, and did contemplate powers higher than three,
but only when reckoning the solutions to problems. The change in the
mode of mathematical reasoning between Cardano and Viète indicates
a change in the conception of number precisely because it takes place in
the context of proof, where philosophical niceties matter.
Viète’s scientific aspirations for his algebra are clearest in the pro-
grammatic part of his work. At the start of chapter two of his Introduc-
tion to the Analytic Art [Viète 1591], he says, “Analysis accepts as proven
the well-known fundamental rules of equations and proportions that are
given in the Elements”. There follows a list of ‘rules’, the first six of which
are adapted from the common notions of Euclid. The remaining ten rules
are adapted from book V of Euclid (sometimes attributed to Eudoxus
of Cnidus), on ratio and proportion. He then claims that, “a propor-
tion may be said to be that from which an equation is composed and
an equation that into which a proportion resolves itself.”3 This formula
is essential to the scientific status of Viète’s art because it connects his
analytic techniques with the theorem-proving side of mathematics. As
one would expect given this fundamental principle, he argues in succeed-
ing chapters for algebraic results on grounds drawn from the Euclidean
theory of proportion. Like Cardano, then, Viète presented himself as
a follower of Euclid. However, he appeals to book V only, and since
this concerns proportion rather than geometry, it does not impose the
same constraints as Cardano’s standards of rigour. It is, therefore, less
misleading to describe him as a follower of Eudoxus than as a follower
of Euclid.
3“Itaque Proportio potest dici constitution æqualitatis. Æqualitas, resolutio pro-
portionis” [Viète 1646, 2].
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In Viète, then, we have on the one hand an art with an aspiration to
scientific status grounded by a sort of equivalence principle in Euclidean
(or better, Eudoxan) tradition and presented as a body of theorems. On
the other, we have a useful notational innovation that permits one to
argue for general results, but which has not yet developed to the point
where the manipulation of symbolic expressions counts as argument.
3 Thomas Harriot (1560-1618)
Thomas Harriot’s Artis Analyticae Praxis [Harriot 1631] shares the sci-
entific aspirations of Viète’s algebra. Like Viète, Harriot lays down defi-
nitions and he orders his results into minor lemmas and major theorems.
He celebrates a completed proof with Quad Erat Probandum or Quad
Erat Demonstrandum. In spite of the title given to his work by oth-
ers when it was published posthumously (Artis. . . ), he evidently shared
Viète’s aspiration to establish algebra as a science. There is another
similarity to Viète that connects Harriot with book V of Euclid. Look
at his proof that the arithmetic mean of two unequal numbers is greater
than the geometric mean (figure 3). Rather than start with the minimal
assumption that p > q, and then multiply each side by p−q, he observes
that p2, pq, q2 is a series in proportion and therefore he can immediately
state that p2 − pq > pq − q2. As in Viète, the theory of proportions in
book V of Euclid is the assumed ground upon which the new science is
to be built.
Another aspect of Harriot’s scientific aspirations for algebra was his
system of canonical equations. These are equations with straightforward
solutions. Every non-canonical equation was associated with a canonical
equation of the same degree, from which, Harriot hoped, it would be
possible to solve the non-canonical case, or at least calculate the number
and signs of the solutions. Harriot was not the first to attempt to classify
equations. The point is that an objective taxonomy is part of what would
distinguish a true science from an art or craft.
Harriot’s notation was more highly developed than that of Viète. He
employed Robert Recorde’s familiar equality sign and the present-day
symbol for inequality. He did not use superscripted numbers for expo-
nents (we owe that to Descartes4), but instead repeated the letter or
4Descartes does not appear in this photo-album for two reasons. First, in his
mathematics the relation between algebra and geometry is too complex and philo-
sophically fraught to treat briefly. Second, in his epistemology he rejects formal
deduction in favour of the lucid perception of clear and distinct ideas. For him, a
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Figure 2: [Viète 1646, 20]
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expression: for our p2 he wrote pp. Consequently, he could not have
entertained fractional or complex exponents. However, there was a vi-
tal notational innovation: combinations of operations. Rather than use
brackets, he expressed products of polynomials by listing the factors ver-
tically, next to a vertical line. That is, for our (a + b) (c− d), Harriot
wrote
a + b
c− d
∣∣∣∣ (it is easy to imagine how this might have evolved out of
the usual method for multiplying numbers). This capacity of Harriot’s
notation to combine symbols for operations made it sufficiently powerful
to induce a qualitative difference from the work of Cardano and Viète. In
Cardano, mathematical argument, expressed in Latin prose, made essen-
tial use of diagrams and appealed to geometrical intuition. As for Viète,
what little argument he offered, he couched in a mixture of symbols and
prose. That is because he had nothing to play the role of brackets. His
notation did not allow him to combine operations and thereby create
complex expressions. Rather, to avoid ambiguity, he had to fall back
into prose. To return to the example above, he wrote 6A2B + 2B3 as
“A quadratum in B sexies + B cubo bis”. However, replacing a complex
expression with an equivalent is the characteristic form of algebraic ar-
gument. It is precisely because Viète’s notation did not allow this that
he was unable to lay out his derivations explicitly, relying instead on his
readers’ numerical intuition. In Harriot, however, the manipulation of
symbols counts as argument. The argument starts with the condition
of the theorem expressed as an equation (or in the case in hand, an in-
equality). By a series of truth-preserving manipulations this is converted
into the required conclusion. Cardano’s great slabs of Latin prose have
vanished, replaced by a terse commentary, the sole purpose of which is to
distinguish each manipulation from its neighbours (“Ergo. . . Sed . . . ”).
It is at about this point that mathematics became ‘the discipline in which
your pencil is smarter than you are’. That is, insight is still required but
where this fails, one can go some distance by relying on the notation and
its rules (though these are as yet implicit, so the project of proving their
reliability cannot even be mooted).
deductive sequence is one intellectual intuition sliced into a series of lesser intuitions
in order to accommodate the limits of human memory. Consequently, to divide the
movement from premises to conclusion into a sequence of small steps can have peda-
gogic or psychological value only. By his own standards he had no logical requirement
to do this: readers in whom the light of reason burns sufficiently brightly will see the
truth of his claims. For more on Descartes and deduction see [Larvor 2001].
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Figure 3: [Harriot 1631, 72]
54 Brendan Larvor
4 John Pell (1611-1685)
The final photograph is of the work of John Pell. This is inevitably a
blurred image because Pell did not publish a work on algebra under his
own name. Instead, we have An Introduction to Algebra, originally writ-
ten in German by a Johann Rahn, translated into English by one Thomas
Brancker “much altered and augmented by D. P .” (title page), and
published in 1668. Whatever the division of authorship between Rahn,
Brancker and Pell, this work is interesting because in it the passage of
algebra from geometry and prose to symbolic manipulation reaches its
conclusion (though the development of the notation does not).
On the page reproduced here as figure 4, we find the recipe for
Pythagorean triads. This is just one of many number-theoretic results
in this work. The interest for our purposes is the division of the page
into three columns. On the right, in the broadest column, the proof is
carried out. In the narrow, middle column, each line of the proof has a
number. In the left-hand column, each line has a note using previous line-
numbers to explain how the current line of the proof was derived. These
elements—numbered lines and comments—are now familiar to program-
mers and logicians. The comments themselves are easily standardised
because there are only finitely many possible types of manipulation to
get from one line to the next, namely the usual operations of arithmetic,
plus the substitution of equivalent expressions. In place of Cardano’s
geometric standards of rigour, we now have a simple rule: make sure
you apply the same operation to both sides of the equation. One could,
in principle, check this syntactically.
This possibility was not lost on one of the leading mathematicians
of the day. Leibniz dreamed of a language in which logical errors would
show up as faulty grammar, as if in natural language “errors were due
to solecisms or barbarisms”.5 The development of algebraic notation
meant that algebra had this property (or something very close to it)
by the middle of the seventeenth century. That is, Cardano could have
expressed faulty mathematical arguments in correct and elegant Latin,
because there was no relationship between the syntax of the language
and the rigour of the proof. Indeed, the science-minded philosophers of
the seventeenth century tended to suspect that the literary skill of their
humanist predecessors served precisely to disguise logical fallacies. In the
language of algebra, however, faulty logic shows up as faulty syntax. It
would be a long time before anyone was in a position to try to prove this,
5De scientia universalis seu calculo philosophico [Leibniz 1960 vol. VII, 200].
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not least because the modern notion of a wholly uninterpreted symbolism
was not yet fully articulated. Nevertheless, the possibility of automated
(‘blind’), valid argument was discernible (to Leibniz at any rate) in the
algebra of the mid-to-late seventeenth century.
5 Disputes over the notion of proof
Our sequence of four snapshots illustrates a change in the notion of
mathematical proof in little over a century between Cardano (1545) and
Pell (1668). Indeed, the crucial change was already present in Har-
riot’s posthumous work of 1631, in which the manipulation of symbols is
presented as proof. As we have seen, such manipulation was possible be-
cause Harriot’s notation had a device equivalent to brackets, so he could
distribute multiplication over addition. This richness permitted the sub-
stitution of equivalent expressions. Gathering terms and multiplying
out brackets could now be done explicitly in the notation rather than
merely described in prose. Therefore, the introduction of brackets is as
important a step as Viète’s use of letters for unknowns and coefficients.
This shift in the notion of proof required the abandonment of Cardano’s
conception of rigour, dependant as it was on geometrical intuition. This
change was part of the much larger philosophical and scientific turmoil of
the time—Cardano published his Ars Magna two years after the publica-
tion of Copernicus’ De revolutionibus orbium coelestium. In view of the
intense contemporary debate about the philosophical foundations of sci-
entific knowledge, it is implausible that mathematicians of the time did
not ask whether these changes were compatible with rigour, even though
our four chosen figures had relatively little to say about the nature of
proof. Mention has already been made of the renaissance Quaestio de
Certitudine Mathematicarum. As the seventeenth century opened the
debate shifted its focus. Rather than accounting for the certainty of
(Euclidean) mathematics, the problem was to understand the logical re-
lations between different parts of mathematics. Algebra was only one
new arrival: mathematicians had to contemplate complex numbers and
indivisibles too. These changes have generated a rich historiography6,
to which I hope to add just one point.
There was, by the middle of the seventeenth century, an accumulation
of results that could not possibly be proved geometrically. These were
6See [Mancosu 1992; Mancosu 1996] for developments in France and Italy; [Sasaki
1985; Pycior 1997] for the English end of the story, and the Hobbes-Wallis-Barrow
controversy in particular.
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Figure 4: [Rahn 1668, 84]
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mostly number-theoretic results such as the sums of finite series (prin-
cipally arithmetic progressions and powers thereof), or formulae such as
the Pythagorean recipe taken from Pell’s algebra above. Mathematicians
explored the triangle of binomial coefficients (‘Pascal’s triangle’). Some
of these (such as the Pythagorean recipe) could be proved using existing
algebraic techniques, while others would have to wait for the development
of proof by complete induction. In addition, equations themselves were
becoming objects of study. Cardano noted that the complex roots of an
equation occur in pairs, but had no means to prove it. The symmetric
functions of coefficients were identified in Girard’s L’invention nouvelle
en l’algèbre of [Girard1629]. Descartes’ ‘rule of signs’ for calculating the
number of positive and negative roots of a real-valued equation from the
changes in sign in the coefficients (intimated in Cardano and sometimes
attributed to Harriot) had to wait until the eighteenth century for a rig-
orous treatment. In his algebra, Pell appealed to the modern sense of
dimension: the number of data should equal the number of unknowns,
or else the solution will be under- or over-determined.7 Cardano had
to admit that a few rather recondite phenomena could not be treated
within his standards of rigour. Since these were so few, he had the op-
tion of conserving his standards while noting the anomalies as such. His
successors in the following century faced an avalanche of arithmetical
and number theoretical results that could not be proved in Cardano’s
Euclidean style. Moreover, algebra began to distinguish itself from arith-
metic as mathematicians discerned general features of equations (such
as the symmetric functions or the rule of signs). As a result, the con-
servative horn of Cardano’s dilemma disappeared. Faced with all this
new material, mathematicians had no option than to abandon Cardano’s
geometrical standards of rigour.
7Wallis comments on this in his Treatise of Algebra [Wallis 1684, 214]. With
reference to the remark above about national styles and rivalries, part of Wallis’ aim
is to argue Harriot’s priority over Descartes. According to Wallis, everything purely
algebraic in Descartes was already there in Harriot, and Descartes merely applied
algebra to geometry [Wallis 1684, v]. Wallis produces no more than an anecdote in
support of his claim that Descartes must have known of Harriot’s work, and does not
see any anachronism in projecting back to Harriot’s time the notion of ‘pure’ algebra
(as distinct from geometry).
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